Moreover, many of the arguments by which the position of rigid libertarians of the older school has been proved untenable.
I also associated with people who were proud to be called libertarians.
What is possibly not so obvious is the extent to which libertarians have themselves been guilty of a similar fallacy.
It has been held in various forms. In its extreme form it maintains that the individual is absolutely free to chose this or that action indifferently (the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae), but most libertarians admit that acquired tendencies, environment and the like, exercise control in a greater or less degree.
Although he denies liberty to the will in this sense - indeed, strictly speaking, neither liberty nor necessity, he says, is properly applied to the will, " for the will itself is not an agent that has a will " - he nevertheless insists that the subject willing is a free moral agent, and argues that without the determinate connexion between volition and motive which he asserts and the libertarians deny, moral agency would be impossible.